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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
TAX COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH, ex rel, GOOD 
SHEPHERD LUTHERAN CHURCH, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 141^2 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Is an original action in certiorari to review 
certain proceedings, orders and decisions of the Tax Commission 
of the State of Utah wherein certain properties located in Salt 
Lake County and assessed by said county for the year 1972 were 
subsequently exempted by the State Tax Commission of Utah. 
DISPOSITION BY TAX COMMISSION 
Petitioner filed a petition for formal hearing with 
the State Tax Commission which hearing resulted in a decision by 
the Commission whereby the decision of the County Board of Equaliaz-
tion was reversed and set aside and the subject property was 
exempted from ad valorem taxes for the year 1972. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks review and reversal of the decision 
of the Tax Commission and the whole thereof, and that the case be 
remanded back to the Tax Commission of the State of Utah directing 
said administrative agency to make and enter its decision that the 
said residence owned by Good Shepherd Lutheran Church and used by 
its pastor is not being used exclusively for religious worship as 
that term is defined by Article XIII Section 2 of the Constitution 
of Utah* and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and that 
the Assessor of Salt Lake County be directed to enter the same on 
the rolls of Salt Lake County, and that the same be taxed for the 
year 1972 and subsequent years without any exceptions. Further, 
petitioner seeks a determination by this Court that Sections 
59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, are 
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References to the transcript of proceedings are 
designated "T" with the page number following. 
Petitioner Salt Lake County is a legal and political 
subdivision of the State of Utah. 
The Tax Commission of the State of Utah is an 
administrative body existing by virtue of the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
••.,/—. Petitioner derives a substantial portion of its 
revenue from the assessment, levy and collection of ad valorem 
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taxes upon all taxable property located within Salt Lake County. 
The tax herein involved is the ad valorem property tax assessed 
by Salt Lake County for the year 1972 against certain improved 
property located at 1376 East 8850 South, Sandy, Utah, Salt Lake 
County. Tax Serial No. 34-0494-015. 
Application for exemption for the year 1972 was made by 
the property owner to the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization 
and exemption was denied. An appeal was made to the Tax Commission 
of Utah. (T-l) 
Applciation was again made to the County Board of 
Equalization for the year 1973. The 1973 application for exemption 
was again denied by Salt Lake County. (T-15) 
On November 19, 19735 the Tax Commission issued its 
written decision with regard to 1973 taxes and thereby reversed the 
Salt Lake County Board of Equalization and granted the exemption. 
(T-12) 
Thereafter, in 1974 notice was sent to the property 
owner with regard to the appeal for 19 72 to ascertain whether or 
not any differences existed with regard to the use of the property 
for the year 1973 and the year 1972. 
A formal hearing was held on May 9, 19 75 before the 
Tax Commission (T-17) 
The evidence presented at the hearing established 
that the property in question consisted of: a two-story residence 
with an attached garage built in 1961. The home is half aluminum 
siding and half block exterior walls. It contains 1750 square 
3 
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feet of living area with a half basement and 1 1/2 baths. 
The property is well landscaped and the home has forced air gas 
heat and in excellent condition. The assessed value was $3,950, 
market value was $19>750. (T-l8) There are 4 bedrooms and a 
full bath upstairs and a half bath downstairs. It has a living 
room and a kitchen area big enough to include a dining area* 
(T-26) The basement Is unfinished containing the furnace, washer 
and dryer and storage area. 
The pastor, his wife and three children occupy the 
bedrooms. There is no office in the home* (T-27) A limited or 
occasional number of meetings are held in the living room of the 
home. (T-l8, 25) However, the church facility served by the pastor 
which is located about one and one-half miles from the residence 
here in question contains an office, conference room and classrooms 
for religious instructions for youth and adults. (T-25, 27) The 
pastor does receive telephone calls at home. 
The home is owned by the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church 
and is furnished to the pastor as part of his overall compensation. 
Except for the fact that the home is occupied and lived in by a 
minister of the church, the home would probably not be distinguish-
able from any other home in the neighborhood. (T-28) 
On May 14, 1975, the Tax Commission issued its decision 
and found that the property was exempt under Article XIII Section 2 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah and in accordance with the 
provisions of Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-313 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, further determining that said property is used 
4 
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for religious worship or charitable purposes which are incidental 
to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of such 
religious worship or charitable purposes. (T-19) 
On the 13th day of June, 1975, Petitioner, Salt Lake 
County, filed a Petition for Writ of Review asserting that the 
property in question was not used in such a manner as to entitle 
it to exemption within the meaning of Article XIII Section 2 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. Further, that the provi-
sions of Section 59-2-30 and Section 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953* as amended, as interpreted and applied by the Tax Commission 
were inconsistent with the Constitution of Utah, Article XIII 
Section 2. That the decision of the Tax Commission was arbitrary 
and capricious, not supported by the evidence, and, therefore, 
without basis in law or fact. The petition further seeks the 
reversal or setting aside of the decision of the Tax Commission. 
Based upon the Petition for Writ of Review, this Court on the 13th 
day of June, 1975, issued its Writ of Review to the Tax Commission 
directing said Commission to certify the record to this Court and 
give notice of the pendency of the Writ to all interested parties. 
5 
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{ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESIDENCE OWNED BY GOOD SHEPHERD LUTHERAN CHURCH WAS NOT 
USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR RELIGIOUS WORSHIP TO QUALIFY IT FOR 
EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE XIII 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND SECTION 59-2-1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The question to be resolved in this case is whether 
the home, used as a residence for the pastor of Good Shepherd 
Lutheran Church and his family, has been used exclusively for 
"religious worship" as shown by the facts adduced in this 
case under and by virtue of Article XIII Section 2 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The material part of the Constitution of the State 
of Utah pertinent to the issue before this Honorable Court is 
Article XIII Section 2 which provides as follows: 
"All tangible property in the state, 
not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall 
be taxed in proportion to its value, 
to be ascertained as provided by law. 
The property of the state, counties, 
cities, towns, school districts, munic-
ipal corporations and public libraries, 
lots with the buildings thereon used 
exclusively for either religious worship 
or charitable purposes/ *** shall be 
exempt from taxation.***" (Emphasis supplied) 
Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as 
follows: 
"The property of the United States, of 
this state, counties, cities, towns, 
school districts, municipal corporations 
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and public libraries* lots with the 
buildings thereon used exclusively for 
either religious worship or charitable 
purposes1,'*'*"*" shall be exempt from 
taxation," (Emphasis supplied) 
The instant case is one of first impression for this 
Honorable Court. Petitioner is not aware of any cases decided 
by the Court in its 78-year history since statehood involving 
an interpretation of the property tax exemption extended to 
property used exclusively for religious worship under Article 
XIII Section 2 of the Constitution of Utah. There is some 
discussion of this language by Justice Crockett in his concurring 
opinion in B.P.O.E. No, 85 v. TAX COMMISSION, 536 P.2d 1214 (1975), 
There have, however, been numerous cases decided by this Court 
in the interpretation of the charitable exemption involved in 
the same constitutional provision, and although they do not 
involve precisely the same language as is involved in this case, 
they do afford guidelines regarding the manner in which this 
Court has generally approached the exemption provisions of the 
Constitution and statutes. Petitioner asserts that the owner 
has not met the burden required of it to show that the residence 
facility should be exempt from taxation and, therefore, an excep-
tion to the general rule that all property of whatever kind soever 
and by whomsoever owned is subject to taxation. An exemption must 
not be aided by judicial interpretation. The rule of strict 
construction applies. All doubts must be resolved against the 
exemption. See PARKER v. QUINN, 64 P. 961, 23 Utah 332, wherein 
this Court states as follows: 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
"..•The general rule is that all 
property of what kind soever, and by 
whomsoever owned, be subject to taxa-
tion; and, when any kind of property is 
exempt, it constitutes an exception to 
this rule. The reason of the rule is 
that it is just and equitable that every .-."•• 
species of property within the state 
should bear its equal proportion of the 
burdens of government. When, therefore, 
an owner claims that certain property is 
exempt from taxation? the burden is upon 
him to show that it falls within the 
exception. And an exception will not 
be aided by judicial interpretation.... 
In such cases, the rule of strict con-
struction applies, and in order to 
relieve any species of property from its 
dueand just proportion of the burdens 
of the government, the language relied 
on as creating the exemption should be 
so clear as not to admit of reasonable 
controversy about is meaning; for all 
doubts must be resolved against the exemp-
tion. The power to tax rests upon 
necessity, and is essential to the exist-
ence of the state." (Emphasis supplied) 
"...The exemptions thus expressly granted 
as we have seen form an exception to the 
general rule that every species of property 
within the state is liable to bear its 
just proportion of the public burden. Any 
property falling within the exception is 
released from this burden, and such release 
is justified on the theory^ that the state 
derives some peculiar benefit—-whatever that 
may be--from such property...." (Emphasis ours) 
The applicant in the instant case did not introduce 
any facts whatever to show that the residence of the pastor 
was in any way substantially different from the thousands of 
individual residences owned by the various individual taxpayers 
in the county. The use is precisely the same. It is a two-
story residence with an attached garage built on the subject 
o 
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property in 1961. The home is half aluminum siding and half 
block exterior walls. It contains 1750 square feet of living 
area with a half basement and 1 1/2 baths. The property is 
well landscaped and the home has forced air gas hear and is in 
excellent condition* The upstairs is four bedrooms and that is 
the extent of the bedrooms and the full bath upstairs and a half 
bath downstairs," "...It has a living room and a kitchen area 
that is big enough to include a dining area as part of it." 
(T-25-26) 
The basement is unfinished, containing a furnace, 
washer and dryer and storage for tools and other similar items. 
The pastor, his wife and their children (4) (of which 3 are home) 
occupy the bedrooms. There is no office in the home, (T-27) 
although some meetings and Bible study classes have been conducted 
in the living room. (T-27) Except for the fact that the home is 
occupied by a minister, the home would not be distinguishable 
from any other home in the neighborhood. (T-28). The fair market 
value for the year 1972 would exceed $19,750.00. (T-26) 
This property is used as a residential dwelling. The 
Constitution of Utah exempts property used exclusively for 
religious worship not property used exclusively as a residence. 
To grant an exemption to property used "exclusively as a residence" 
would amount to an absolute perversion of the plain meaning of 
our constitution. It would also open the door to great abuse. 
Certainly the fact that the property is owned by an 
ecclesiastical organization cannot be the basis for such an 
Q 
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exemption. The religious worship exemption is granted by 
virtue of use, not ownership. The use gives rise to the exemp-
tion. In ODD FELLOWS1 BUILDING ASS'N v. NAYLOR, 177 P. 214, 
53 Utah 111 (1918), this Court answered the question of ownership 
as affecting use exemptions wherein it indicated that it must 
be conceded that the owners of the property, to be exempt within 
the purview of the Constitution, are not limited to ecclesiastical 
or charitable organizations, but the exemption privileges extended 
to the class of property mentioned, without regard to the character 
of its owner. The owner may be a church organization, a charitable 
or fraternal organization or It may be a private individual or 
corporation. It is, therefore, the use of the property that 
determines its taxable status. 
In the case of FRIENDSHIP MANOR CORPORATION v. TAX 
COMMISSION, 487 P2d 1272, 26 Utah 2d 227 (1971), this Court again 
had occasion to examine the charitable use exemption of the Utah 
Constitution. In that case, the property owner was organized 
as a Utah non-profit corporation. The organization undertook to 
construct a housing project for elderly persons which was also 
sponsored by four religious organizations. The organization had 
been determined to be a charitable organization for purposes of 
federal taxation under Sections 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. A 228-unit facility was constructed in Salt Lake which 
was rented out to certain tenants meeting specified requirements 
including (1) that the tenants must be ambulatory; (2) they must 
be financially able to maintain or pay the rent, as well as take 
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care of themselves. No persons were accepted who were not 
financially responsible to pay the expenses or maintain the standard 
of living required by the manor and, in general, tenants were 
required to be 62 years of age or older, except FHA regulations 
did allow 20$ of the total number of apartments to be rented 
to persons under 62. The defendant's position in the case was 
basically that the property could not be used exclusively for 
charitable purposes when the tenants are required to pay for 
all of the facilities and services they receive and that the 
only charity involved is that the tenants pay less rent because 
of the property tax exemption. The Court held the manor to be 
taxable and reversed the decision of the trial court. In reaching 
its decision, the Court made several significant statements. At 
page 1276, the Court indicated 
"it is the use to which it puts its 
real property which is the determination 
of whether or not such property is exempt. 
If the charitable organization does not 
use its real property and building thereon 
exclusively for charitable purposes, such 
property is not exempt, notwithstanding the 
fact that the owner thereof is a charitable 
organization,rt 
The Court further indicated that 
"the fact that plaintiff is exempt from 
federal taxation under the provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code is not determina-
tive, although the non-profit aspect would 
be a necessary ingredient of a qualifying, 
charitable operation." at page 1277 
The Court thereupon restated the general rule regarding property 
tax exemptions and at page 1280 stated 
11 
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"The general rule is then that all property 
is taxed unless exempt, and to be exempt, 
the burden is upon the property owner to 
show it falls within the exemption. 
The power to tax rests upon necessity 
!
 and is essential to the existence of the 
s u a T/ e«• • • 
The use of the property is then the basis upon which an exemption 
can be granted, not the mere ownership. 
The extent of property tax exemptions for religious 
property has been the subject of great debates. The privilege 
of exemption for religious institutions goes back to antiquity. 
The priestly classes in Ancient Greece, Persia, Egypt and India 
enjoyed property tax exemptions. In biblical times, the exemp-
tion was granted to Levites and other functionaries in the Temple 
in Jerusalem. In the 4th Century, Emperor Constantine, a convert 
to Christianity, granted tax immunity to the Catholic Church. 
The practice of religious exemptions thereafter became a European 
tradition, interrupted briefly by Henry the VIII of England and 
Napolean Boneparte. These traditions were brought to America 
with the first colonists and have found their way into most state 
constitutions and, where not conferred by state constitution, the 
exemption has resulted from judicial decisions and statutes. See 
A REPORT ON CHURCHES AND TAXATION, Guild of St. Ives, May 1967 p 1; 
Also Van Alstyne, TAX EXEMPTION OF CHURCH PROPERTY, 20 Ohio State 
Law Journal, 461-62 (1959); also, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS 
TAX BENEFITS, 49 Columbia Law Review 968092 (1949); Time Magazine, 
15 May, 1964, p 53. 
Each state has its own separate constitution and 
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exemption standard, but It is almost universally agreed that 
language such as that found in Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah 
Constitution creates a very narrow exemption. The principle 
of strict construction of tax exemption statutes is applied with 
greater frequency to statutes exempting property used exclusively 
for "religious worship" or for "public worship" than those 
exempting property "used exclusively for religious purposes", 
with the result that residential or recreational facilities of 
religious organizations are less likely to be granted exemption 
within the former than within the latter. See 15 ALR 2d 1068 
note 4. 
In PEOPLE ex rel. THOMPSON vs. FIRST CONGREGATIONAL 
CHURCH OF OAK PARK, 232 111. 158, 83 N.E. 536 (1908), the Illinois 
Supreme Court was asked to interpret a fact situation almost 
identical to the one in the instant case. In that case, the property 
in question was improved by a 10-room, two-story frame house and 
a barn. The lot and buildings were of ordinary size used for 
residential purposes in Oak Park. The property was not used for 
pecuniary profit, and no rent or revenue of any kind was derived. 
The premises were used by the pastor of the said church and his 
immediate family as a residence, and the pastor devoted his whole 
time to the work of his church* The Illinois Constitution granted 
exemption to property used exclusively for religious purposes. 
A much broader standard than that of the Utah Constitution. The 
legislature had passed a statute exempting all church property 
used exclusively for public worship and further granted exemption 
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to parsonages or residences actually used by persons devoting 
their entire time to church work. The Illinois Supreme Court 
denied the exemption and held the statute to be unconstitutional. 
That court made the following significant statements in its 
decision: 
"The parsonage in this case was used as a 
home for the pastor and the members of his 
immediate family. So far as appears from 
this recordv it was used as afamily 
residence3 and nothing more. As suggested 
in the Kansas case referred to below, there 
seems to be no ground upon which itcanbe 
contended that it was used for a religious 
purpose any more than was the residence of 
any other Christian gentleman who was a 
member of the same churchi 83 N.'EY at 
page 538. 
The court went on to say: 
"Upon reason, the conclusion that the property 
involved in this suit is used primarily 
for a secular or temporal purpose and not 
exclusively for religious purposes within the 
meaning of our constitution seems irresistable." 
The court then compared the language of the constitution 
and the statute involved and distinguished between the language 
"public worship" and religious purposes and made the following 
observation: 
" 'public worship' is less comprehensive 
than the language of our constitution1." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In the case before this Court, there are no facts of 
record to indicate any use other than primarily as a residence. 
Even those states with broader exemption provisions than those 
found in our Constitution would deny the exemption presently before 
the Court. In VAIL v. BEACH, 10 Kan. 214, the court was asked 
iU 
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to exempt a parsonage occupied by the pastor of the church. 
The Kansas court determined that the property was used the same 
as any other dwelling, and as such was not distinguishable 
from the use of the dwelling occupied by any other member of the 
same church, and that it was clearly not the purpose of the 
constitution to relieve such property from taxation. In COUNTY 
OF RAMSEY v. CHURCH OF GOOD SHEPHERD, 45 Minn, 229, ^1 N.W. 783, 
it was said that a parsonage occupied by the pastor as a residence 
was used for a secular and not a religious purpose. In FIRST 
CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH OF DeKALB v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF DeKALB , 
COUNTY, 254 111. 220, 98 N.E. 275 (1912), the Illinois court was 
again asked to ascertain the exempt status of a ministerfs 
residence. Again, that court denied the exemption. In doing so, 
the court drew the distinction between a place of worship and 
•a residence. 
"We think it obvious, therefore, that all 
would understand and readily concede that 
a church is a building which in its primary 
sense is used for a religious purpose; 
that is, such use is its principal and 
general use, and that its occasional use 
as a lecture room or for other similar use 
would not destroy the exemption. On the 
contrary, we think it is equally well under-
stood by all as the very name signifies, 
that the primary use of a parsonage is a 
home for the pastor and his family; that is, 
that such use Is its principal and general use, 
and that the fact that some parts of the 
parsonage are used for purposes connected with 
the pastor's work or the work of the church 
would not make it a building used exclusively 
for religious purposes and exempt it from 
taxation." at page 276 
Further, the court stated: 
IS 
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{ 
"...the primary purpose for which the 
parsonage in question was acquired and possessed 
by the appellant is not religious, but is 
secular, and that it is not exempt from taxation...." 
"There is, however, no evidence found in this 
record which shows that the primary use of 
the parsonage in this is other than a home 
provided by the church for the pastor and his 
• family." 98 N.E. at page 277 
There is no evidence in the case before this Court,. 
nor of record before the Tax Commission that would establish the 
residence of the pastor of Good Shepherd Lutheran Church to be 
used exclusively for religious worship. To the contrary, the 
facts and testimony before the Commission as regards the use of 
the home, is that it is used as a residence. Under these factual 
circumstances, there is no basis upon which an exemption can be 
granted. Nor should the Court be influenced by the profession 
of the occupant. "...The fact that a parsonage is used by a 
minister who devotes himself entirely to the services of God and 
to works of religion and charity, whereby the interests of his 
church are subserved, does not convert the parsonage from a 
secular into a religious use." 98 N.E. 275 at page 277 
In a comprehensive review of state exemption provisions 
and authorities, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne made the following 
observation: 
"The exact terminology of the exemption 
law, of course, is the most significant 
factor to be considered. Thus religious 
'worship' being demonstrably narrower than 
religious 'purposes1," 
SIERRA RETREAT v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 35 Cal. 2d 775, 221 
P.2d 59 (1950); PEOPLE v. LOGAN SQUARE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, 2^ 9 111. 
9, 94 N.E. 155 (1911); TRUSTEES OF GRISWOLD COLLEGE v. STATE OF 
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IOWA, 46 Iowa 706 (1877), ministerial residences have usually 
been denied exemption where exclusive use for religious "worship" 
is the test, ST. MARK'S CHURCH v. CITY OF BRUNSWICK, 78 Ga. 54l, 
35 S.E. 561 (1887); TRUSTEES OF METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. 
ELLIS, 38 Ind. 3 (1871); SOCIETY OF PRECIOUS BLOOD v. BOARD OF 
TAX APPEALS, 1^ 9 Ohio St. 67, 77 N.E. 2d 459 (1948); TRINITY 
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH v. SAN ANTONIO, 201 S.W. 669 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1918), WILLIAM T. STEAD MEMORIAL CENTER v. WAREHAM, 299 
Mass. 235, 12 N.E. 2d 725 (1938), but have often obtained relief, 
modernly at least, under a requirement of exclusive use for 
religious "purposes." See Van Alstyne, 20 Ohio State Law Journal 
(1959) p 483. 
Petitioner submits that the only conclusion that 
can be properly drawn from the facts of this case and the law 
that is applicable to the residence in question is that the pro-
perty is used exclusively for residential purposes and is, there-
fore, not entitled to exemption under Article XIII Section 2 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT II 
SECTIONS 59-2-30 and 59-2-31 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, ARE 
NULL AND VOID BECAUSE THEY ARE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXTENSION 0^ 
THE EXEMPTIONS GRANTED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, 
speaks in terms of "religious worship." Section 59-2-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 is a rephrasing of the constitutional 
provision and uses the standard "religious worship." In 1972, 
the Utah State Legislature passed Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31. 
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{ 
Section 59-2-303 when dealing with the religious exemption, 
substitutes the word "purposes" for "worship". When the Tax 
Commission granted the exemption, it did so on the basis of 
Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(T-19) Petitioner asserts that Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, constitute an unconstitu-
tional extension of the religious exemption granted by the Utah 
Constitution, Article XIII Section 2, and are in direct conflict 
with the Constitution and Section 59-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. The above cited authorities make it unequivocally 
clear that the language "religious purposes" is much broader than 
"religious worship" and that the substitution of the word "purposes" 
for "worship" render statutes 59-2-30 and 59-2-31 unconstitutional 
because they grant exemptions from property taxes to classes of 
property not included within the constitutional language and, 
therefore, beyond the power of the legislature to expand. This 
precise question has already been decided bv this Honorable Court. 
In STATE v; ARMSTRONG, 53 P. 9 8l (1898), this Court 
had occasion to review the legal ability of the legislature to 
expand exemptions beyond constitutional limitations. That case 
involved the validity of a legislative enactment extending the 
constitutional language granting exemptions from property taxes 
to include "insane, idiotic, inform or indigent persons...." The 
petitioner in that case asserted that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because it exempted property not included in the constitution. 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed. And, in agreeing, this Court made 
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the following statements: 
"The meaning and intent manifest from the 
constitution are that no property shall 
be relieved from the burden of maintaining 
the government, except such as was defined 
and specified for exemption by that instru-
ment." See 53 P. 98l at page 983 
and further, at page 983, 
"No one would contend for a moment that the 
legislature of this state has power in 
express terms to exempt property from taxa-
tion, other than that enumerated for exemp-
tion in the constitution; and yet in the 
enactment of the statute in question the 
legislature has undertaken to indirectly 
exempt property not so enumerated... 
...To prevent the legislature from exempting 
property not included within the exemptions 
of the constitution, express words were not 
necessarytt 
...The positive direction that fall property 
not exempt under the laws of the United j 
States or under this constitution shall be 
taxed,1 and that the rate of assessmeent and 
taxation shall be 'uniform and equal,f so 
that Tevery person and corporation shall 
pay a tax in proportion to the value of 
his, her or its property * with the enumeration 
of the property exempted, contains an implica-
tion against an exemption of any other property 
by the legislature. That direction itself 
operates as a restraint upon the legislative 
power." 
The Court thereupon declared that statute to be null 
and void. In doing so, the Court described its function as 
regards the judicial review "of legislative enactments stating: 
"...we are not unmindful of the fact that 
the question whether an enactment of the 
legislature is void because of its 
repugnancy to the constitution is always 
one of much delicacy, and a doubtful case 
should seldom, if ever, be decided in the 
affirmative. Where, however, the mind is 
1Q 
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convinced of the unconstitutionality of the 
laWy the duty which devolves upon the court 
to declare it so is Imperative; even where3 
as In this case, thestatute appears to be 
in cons onaric'e with
 vj ustice "and humariity. 
That the law itself would be beneficent 
can be of ho avail in this case3 because 
its effect and operation would be to exempt 
property against the mandate of the 
fundamental law/tT (Emphasis suppTied) page 983 
T h e
 ARMSTRONG case has not been overruled by this 
Court. To the contrary, this Court has had occasion to cite 
favorably from that case in numerous instances. Petitioner asserts 
that the Court in the instant case should follow the ARMSTRONG 
decision and declare Sections 59-2-30 and 59-2-31, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953
 5 as amended, to be an unauthorized extension of 
the constitutional exemption of property used exclusively for 
religious worship and declare the enactments to be unconstitutional. 
The consequences of the indiscriminate granting of exemptions 
from property taxation was the subject matter of a report prepared 
for the Advisory Committee to the Taxation Standing Committee 
of the Utah Legislative Council and weru summarized thusly: 
. "The problem is that institutional tax exemption has 
often been carried beyond its basic purpose and has been abused. 
There is clearly a need in Utah to tighten up some of these 
exemptions. Some also feel that tax exemption is an undesirable 
method of aiding such institutions. The Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relationb has summarized the problem thusly: 
It seems to have become progressively easier 
for almost any organization that engages in 
some activity of social or cultural significance 
to make the tax-free list—and once on the 
list its subsidy tends to be permanent. The 
on 
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categories of organizations whose real and 
personal property is now exempt either in 
all states or a considerable number include: 
(1) religious3 including affiliated organiza-
tions; (2) educational and cultural; (3) health 
and welfare; (4) fraternal and benevolent; 
(5) business and professional, such as 
chanbers of commerce, bar associations, 
medical associations, farmers* organizations, 
and labor unions; and (6) veterans7 organiza-
tions . Such exemptions may be restricted to 
property employed directly in nonprofit 
activities, or they may be extended also to 
property earning income for these activities. 
This, in effect, adds up to a large, concealed 
government subsidy for numerous classes of 
nonprofit institutions and organizations 
ranging down from those whose services clearly 
are of a public nature to those whose activities 
may be socially desirable but also may be 
intermingled with professional and business 
interests or even subsidiary to such interests. 
Utah is no exception to this trend. Unfortunately, 
there is little information concerning the assessed values or 
tax losses pertaining to these exempt properties. 
It is strongly urged that the State of Utah adopt the 
following recommendation of the Advisory Commission on Inter-
governmental Relations relative to these institutional exemptions: 
In order that the taxpayers may be kept 
informed each State should require the regular 
assessment of all such tax exempt property, 
compilation of the totals for each type of 
exemption by taxing districts, computation 
of the percentages of the assessed valuation 
thus exempt in each taxing district and publica-
tion of the findings. Such publication should 
also present summary information on the function, 
scope and nature of exempted activities. It is 
also recommended that when such information is 
available, there be periodic review—say every 
five years—of all such exemptions by the State 
Tax Commission with the objective of limiting 
institutional exemptions to those that are clearly 
3i 
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affected with a public interest, 
ACHIEVING MORE EQUITY AND UNIFORMITY IN 
PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT IN UTAH; Report for 
the Advisory Committee to the Taxation 
Standing Committee of the Utah Legislative 
Council, November 1966. 
This Court should give proper recognition to the 
concern of the Legislative Advisory Commission and render a 
decision that would curb the trend towards broadening tax 
exemptions. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
decision of the Tax Commission in reliance upon Sections 59-2-30 
and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, constitute 
an unconstitutional extension of the exemptions listed in 
Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constitution and that the 
statutes that give rise to such extensions are unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit to this Honorable Court that 
the Tax Commission erred, that the only decision supported by 
the record in this case was that of the County Board of Equaliza-
tion, and that the Court direct the Tax Commission to make and enter 
its order that the property known as the parsonage for the pastor 
of the Good Shepherd Lutheran Church, from the factual situation in 
this case, be placed upon the tax rolls of Salt Lake County as 
non-exempt property. And further declare that Sections 59-2-30 
and 59-2-31, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, are unconsti-
tutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM, Salt Lake County Attorney 
BILL THOMAS PETERS, Special Deputy 
County Attorney 
220 South 200 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE " 
I hereby certify that on the /"^~ day of December, 
1975, copies of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner, Salt Lake 
County, were served upon Vernon B, Romney, Attorney for State 
Tax Commission of Utah, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and upon Jerome C. Trelstad, Pastor of Good Shepherd 
Lutheran Church, 1376 East 8850 Souths &^ndy, Utah 84070. 
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